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Abstract
In many countries entrepreneurship is promoted through tax reductions for small busi-
nesses and by various government support schemes. We analyze the effects of such
policies to subsidize small businesses in a setting where both the risk-return charac-
teristics of the selected innovation project and the mode of commercialization chosen
by entrepreneurs (market entry versus sale to an incumbent firm) are endogenous. We
show that government programs to support small businesses foster market entry by
entrepreneurs but, at the same time, give an incentive to choose low risk projects, due
to the existence of limited loss offset provisions. This points to a basic trade-off be-
tween the goals of raising competition in technology-intensive markets and the desire
of governments to foster risky ‘breakthrough’ innovations.
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1 Introduction
In the last few decades, entrepreneurship has emerged as a key issue in the policy
arena.1 In the European Union, for instance, the Commission launched the “Small
Business Act for Europe” in June 2008, which explicitly recognizes the central role of
small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in the EU economy and sets out a compre-
hensive policy framework for the EU and its member states. Among other measures, the
Commission proposes that member states should create an environment that rewards
entrepreneurship, and specifically mentions taxation in this context.2
One of the main reasons for the support of entrepreneurship comes from the important
role they play as providers of “breakthrough” inventions. Baumol (2002), for example,
documents the importance of the different roles played by small entrepreneurial firms
and large established firms in the innovation process in the United States, where small
entrepreneurial firms create a large share of breakthrough inventions whereas large, es-
tablished firms provide more routinized R&D.3 The importance of the level of riskiness
in firms’ R&D strategies and its relation to firm type is illustrated in a recent study
by Henkel et al. (2010). They undertake a qualitative empirical study of the electronic
design automation (EDA) industry, which is characterized by three large incumbents
and numerous start-ups. The authors conclude that “.. as a stylized fact, entrants pur-
sue more radical innovation projects than incumbents. That is, they pursue innovation
projects that are both more likely to fail and, in case of success, be more valuable than
those pursued by incumbents” (p. 21).
At the same time, during the last few decades a substantial share of these breakthrough
inventions has been commercialized through sales to incumbent firms. Blonigen and
Taylor (2000, Table 1) report that high-technology industries have been responsible for
1The Economist (14th March 2009) recently published a special report on entrepreneurship,
“Global Heroes”, describing this phenomenon.
2See Commission of the European Communities (2008). The Small Business Act applies to all
companies which are independent and have less than 250 employees, representing 99% of all European
businesses.
3See also Scherer and Ross (1990) who list a large number of break-through inventions made by
independent innovators and state that “new entrants without a commitment to accepted technologies
have been responsible for a substantial share of the really revolutionary new industrial products
and processes”(p. 653). The authors refer to a large number of studies indicating the importance of
entrepreneurs as providers of breakthrough inventions.
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a disproportionately large share of firm acquisitions in the U.S. manufacturing sector
during the 1990s. For example, the industries of electronic/electrical equipment and
medical/photographic equipment accounted only for 3.1% and 2.2% of all U.S. manu-
facturing firms during this period, but made up 8.9% and 10.2% of all manufacturing
acquisitions.
Entrepreneurs typically face different taxes and subsidies when entering the product
market and when selling the invention. Many start ups choose incorporation and are
thus subject to corporate income taxation, whereas entrepreneurs selling out to in-
cumbent firms are typically liable to personal income taxation on the capital gains
earned. As corporate tax rates have fallen significantly below personal income taxes
during the last decades, this constitutes a first important tax advantage in favor of
market entry.4 Moreover, to support entrepreneurship, many countries grant special
tax provisions to small businesses. Table 1 collects data for several OECD countries
that offer small, incorporated businesses reduced corporate tax rates on their profit
income below a certain threshold (see OECD, 2010a). Finally, governments provide
various support schemes to start-ups and small businesses that cover all stages of the
firms’ development, ranging from initial research grants to the provision of subsidized
loans and state guarantees to spur firm growth (see Lerner 1999, Table 1 for the United
States, and OECD, 2010b). Taken together these provisions imply that an entrepreneur
will typically face lower taxes and higher subsidies if she enters the market herself, as
compared to the alternative of selling her innovation to an incumbent firm.
The above-mentioned developments suggest that it is important for a study of govern-
ment support schemes to small businesses to endogenize both the project choice of the
entrepreneur and the mode of commercializing the entrepreneurial innovation. This is
the main purpose of the present paper. We study how the system of taxes and sub-
sidies influences the risk-return characteristics of entrepreneurial R&D projects, and
how it affects the entrepreneur’s decision of whether to enter the market herself, or
sell the innovation to an incumbent firm. Hence, government policy influences both the
potential of entrepreneurs to make breakthrough inventions, and the market structure
in imperfectly competitive markets characterized by technological innovations.
4The degree of incorporation differs substantially across countries, as a result of diverging national
regulations, for example with respect to minimum capital requirements for corporation. The evidence
also suggests, however, that incorporation has risen, on average, in response to falling corporate tax
rates (de Mooij and Nicode`me, 2008).
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Table 1: Small business corporate tax rates (2010)a
country regular small business amount of
tax rate (%) tax rate (%) tax-favored incomeb
Belgium 34.0 25.0 Euro 25.000
Canada 29.5 15.5 CND 500.000c
France 34.4 15.0 Euro 38.000
Hungary 19.0 10.0 HUF 50 million
Japan 39.5 25.5 Yen 8 million
Korea 24.2 11.0 KRW 200 million
Netherlands 25.5 20.0 Euro 200.000
Spain 30.0 25.0 Euro 120.000
United Kingdom 28.0 21.0 GBP 300.000
United States 39.2 20.2 USD 50.000
a Combined tax rates of all levels of government.
b Corporate income to which small business tax rate is applicable. Total income of the SME
may exceed this amount, as long as firm size remains below critical thresholds (number of
employees, turnover etc.)
c Only for Canadian-controlled private corporations.
Sources: OECD Tax Database (2010a); Canada Revenue Agency (www.cra.gc.ca)
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Our analysis is based on the following model. In the first stage, the entrepreneur makes
an investment and chooses among projects with different risk and return characteristics
associated with developing the invention. In the second stage, before the success of
the project is revealed, the investor decides to either sell her invention to one of the
incumbent firms in the market, or to enter the market herself. These decisions are
influenced by the tax system. If the project is successful, the entrepreneur will benefit
from lower taxes and additional government support when entering the market herself.
If the project fails, however, the entrepreneur will not be able to claim a loss offset, as no
profits are generated from which R&D spending can be deducted. In contrast, when the
project is sold to an incumbent firm the investment outlays are always tax-deductible,
because incumbents have other profits from which to deduct R&D expenses. In a setting
with competitive bidding by incumbents this tax advantage will be reflected in a higher
sales price offered to the entrepreneur. In the third stage, the uncertainty is lifted. If
the investor has decided not to sell her patent and if the invention is successful, she will
enter the market. In the final stage, there is competition between all active firms in the
market, with or without the entrepreneur and with one firm possibly having access to
a superior technology.
The results of our analysis reveal two different effects of tax policy. On the one hand,
tax concessions and subsidies confined to small businesses make market entry by the
entrepreneur more likely in equilibrium, fostering competition in these markets. At
the same time, however, the entrepreneur’s project choice is distorted whenever she
produces for market entry. In particular, when the rate of effective profit taxation is
not too low, the entrepreneur will choose an inefficiently low-risk project in order to
minimize the risk of being left with non-deductible investment outlays. This points to
a basic policy conflict between the goals of raising competition in technology-intensive
markets, and the desire of governments to foster risky ‘breakthrough’ inventions.
In our benchmark model, innovations affect only the fixed costs of production. In an
extension, we show that allowing for variable cost reductions as a result of a successful
innovation strengthens the importance of an efficient project choice among entrepre-
neurs. This may lead to consumers favoring the sale of the entrepreneurial innovation
to incumbent firms, despite the higher market concentration that this entails.
Our model brings together two different strands in the literature. First, there is a rel-
atively small yet established public finance literature that analyzes the effects of taxes
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on various decision margins of entrepreneurs.5 An early contribution is Poterba (1989)
who critically discusses the view that reducing capital gains taxes is an efficient way
of promoting entrepreneurship. Several contributions in this literature focus on the
progressiveness of the personal income tax schedule as an obstacle to entrepreneurial
activity (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000, 2005; Asoni and Sanandaji, 2009). In contrast,
Gordon (1998) and Cullen and Gordon (2007) stress that start-up enterprises have the
option of incorporating and thus benefiting from the fall in corporate tax rates over
the last few decades. This shifts the focus of attention from the progressiveness of the
income tax schedule to the imperfectness of loss offset provisions under the corporate
income tax. Fuest et al. (2002) show that the existence of a positive tax gap between
the personal income tax and the corporation tax favors equity finance and counter-
acts a distortion in the firms’ financial decision arising from asymmetric information.
Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002, 2004) focus on the effects of various tax policies when
entrepreneurs face financial constraints and set up a contract with a venture capitalist
under conditions of one-sided or two-sided moral hazard. Egger et al. (2009) analyze
the incorporation decision of entrepreneurs and provide empirical evidence that higher
personal income taxes favor incorporation, whereas higher corporate tax rates reduce
the probability of incorporating. Finally, Ernst and Spengel (2011) empirically deter-
mine that both R&D tax credits and corporate tax reductions increase the number
of patent applications. None of these papers, however, incorporates a choice between
different R&D projects to be undertaken, nor the option for the entrepreneur to sell
her invention to an incumbent.
Second, this paper is also related to the literature on R&D and market structure,
which mainly focuses on the choice of the level of R&D efforts.6 Several papers study
the type of R&D project undertaken by firms and entrepreneurs (e.g. Bhattacharya
and Mookherjee, 1986). There is also a literature on entrepreneurship and innovations,
which is summarized in Acs and Audretsch (2005), and Bianchi and Henrekson (2005).
To our knowledge, the only analysis considering how the entry mode affects the type
of R&D is Fa¨rnstrand Damsgaard et al. (2010). However, this paper focuses on the
interaction between entrepreneurial and incumbent innovations and abstracts from tax
policies, which are central to the present study.
5See Henrekson and Sanandaji (2011) for a recent survey.
6For overviews, see Reinganum (1989) and Gilbert (2006) and for specific models, see Rosen (1991)
and Cabral (2003).
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general framework of our
benchmark model, where the innovation reduces only fixed costs. In Section 3, we solve
the different stages of the model and determine the equilibrium allocation in different
tax regimes. Section 4 analyzes the effects of tax policy on the R&D project choice
of the entrepreneur and on her commercialization mode. Section 5 analyzes a model
extension where the innovation reduces variable costs of production. Section 6 discusses
several other model extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2 The framework
We consider an imperfectly competitive market with n identical incumbent firms. En-
try costs deter further firms from entering the market, unless they have a superior
technology. The focus of our analysis lies on the decisions of an independent innovator,
or entrepreneur, who chooses a project with certain risk characteristics and decides
whether to sell the invention or try to enter the market herself. To focus on entrepre-
neurs as providers of breakthrough inventions, we assume that the incumbent firms do
not innovate.7 The sequence of events in our benchmark model is depicted in Figure 1.
********* Figure 1 about here **********
In Stage 1, the entrepreneur makes a fixed monetary investment I in risky research
and development (R&D) in order to develop an invention. We suppose there to be an
infinite number of independent research projects that the entrepreneur may undertake,
all requiring the same investment costs I. Hence, investment projects do not vary by
the size of the investment, but by the riskiness of the chosen project. Each project (say
project k) is characterized by a certain success probability pk. Along the technological
frontier, entrepreneurs face a choice between projects that have a high success prob-
ability pk but deliver a small reduction in fixed costs in case of success, and projects
that are more risky but also have a larger payoff, if successful. Importantly, we assume
that the entrepreneur is risk-neutral and thus chooses the project which maximizes the
expected net payoff from the investment.8
7See Gromb and Scharfstein (2002) and Fa¨rnstrand Damsgaard et al. (2010) for models where
innovation takes place both in start-ups and in established firms.
8Hence, we eliminate the well-known effect that taxes may stimulate entrepreneurial risk-taking
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Our benchmark model assumes that a successful invention of type k reduces only the
fixed costs of production. This assumption greatly simplifies the exposition as it implies
that product market competition between all firms remains symmetric and that the
product market price does not depend on the chosen project.9 To give an example,
the fixed cost of producing a prototype part for a new airplane or a racing car can
be reduced by small, low-risk improvements in existing technologies. A high-risk, high-
return alternative is instead to develop a 3D printer which ‘prints’ the prototype part
using titanium powder, causing virtually no waste of this precious material in the
process.10
With projects differing by their degree of innovation, fixed production costs are
F (pk) = F − Γ(pk), (1)
where Γ′k(pk) < 0, pk ∈ (0, 1). Omitting the project index, the expected payoff pΓ(p) is
assumed to be strictly concave in p. The upper panel of Figure 2 illustrates the payoffs
of different projects in terms of expected fixed costs reductions.11
********* Figure 2 about here **********
As shown in Figure 2(i), there is a unique project with success probability 0 < pˆ < 1
that maximizes the expected payoff of the invention, given from the first-order condition
Γ(pˆ) + pˆΓ′(pˆ) = 0. (2)
In the following, we will refer to an R&D project with a risk level of pˆ as the ‘socially ef-
ficient’ project. It is instructive to compare the project type chosen by the entrepreneur
in equilibrium with this socially efficient project. More formally, we introduce
Definition 1: The socially efficient project is given by pˆ = argmaxp pΓ(p).
In Stage 2, after investment I has been made and R&D project k has been chosen, the
entrepreneur can either sell her invention to one of the incumbents or decide to market
by making the government a silent partner in the (risky) operation (Domar and Musgrave, 1944).
However, this effect is fully effective only when losses are tax-deductible. Since our analysis explicitly
focuses on the limitations of loss offset provisions, the Domar-Musgrave effect is of lesser importance.
9In Section 5 we consider the more general case where the invention reduces variable production
costs.
10See the article “The printed world” in The Economist, 10th February 2011.
11The lower panel of Figure 2 will be discussed in Section 3.4 below.
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the invention herself. If the entrepreneur decides to sell her project, the acquiring
incumbent will replace his initial technology with the innovative one. In this case, there
will thus still be n firms in the market, though one firm (the acquirer of the innovation)
may have a superior technology. In the case where the entrepreneur decides to enter
the market, there will be (n + 1) firms in the market, once more with one firm (the
entrepreneur herself) having a possibly superior technology, in the sense of facing lower
fixed production costs.
The entrepreneur’s decision of whether to enter the market or sell the innovation to
one of the incumbent firms is affected by tax considerations. We denote by te the tax
rate faced by the entrepreneur when she decides to enter the market herself, whereas
τ gives the tax rate that is applicable on the income she receives when selling the
project to an incumbent firm. For the reasons given in the introduction, our analysis is
based on a policy setting where te ≤ τ and there is a tax advantage from market entry.
We assume that entrepreneurs incorporate their business when producing for market
entry.12 Hence te represents an effective corporate tax rate for the entrepreneur, which
incorporates reduced tax rates for incomes below a certain threshold (see Table 1) and
government programs to subsidize the commercialization of innovations in small, high-
tech firms. On the other hand, we assume that an entrepreneur who produces for sale
will not incorporate her business and will thus be subject to the capital gains tax rate
τ .13 This equals the marginal individual income tax rate in some countries, whereas
other countries subject capital gains to lower tax rates than other forms of personal
income. In any case, however, τ is very likely to exceed te.
In Stage 3, the uncertainty is revealed and it turns out whether the innovation is
successful or not. If the entrepreneur has not sold her invention, she is free to enter
12According to de Mooij and Nicode`me (2008, Table 1), roughly 35% of all businesses in the Euro-
pean Union were incorporated during the period 1998-2003, with wide divergences across countries.
Interestingly, however, the average share of incorporation was slightly higher among new firms than
among established firms (36.8% vs. 35.7%), despite the fact that established firms are, on average,
much larger. Moreover, selection effects can be clearly observed in the data. In Sweden, for example,
only 25% of all firms which started up in 2005 and were still active in 2008 were incorporated (of a
total of 29 795 start-ups). Among the incorporated start-ups, however, about 72% were high-growth
firms, as compared to 34% high-growth firms in other groups. This indicates that successful innovators
are substantially more likely to use incorporation (see Tillva¨xtanalys, 2010).
13In Section 6.3 we analyze an alternative setting where entrepreneurs that innovate for sale will
also incorporate, but the sale to an incumbent is subject to transaction costs.
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the market at this stage. However, due to entry costs and fixed costs of production,
entering the market will only be profitable when the innovation is successful (i.e. fixed
production costs are low). If the project fails, the entrepreneur will not enter the market
and she will lose all investment costs.
In Stage 4, oligopolistic product market competition occurs between either n or (n+1)
firms, depending on the commercialization decision of the entrepreneur in Stage 2 and
(in case of market entry) on the success of the project in Stage 3. Equilibrium profits
are paid out and taxes are collected on all income.
3 Equilibrium project choice and mode of commer-
cialization
3.1 Stage 4: Product market interaction
We solve the model by backward induction and start with the interaction of firms
in the product market. Let the set of firms in the industry be J = e ∪ I, where
I = {i1, i2...in} is the set of identical incumbent firms and e is the entrepreneur. The
owner of the invention is denoted by l ∈ J . In the product market interaction, firm
j chooses an action xj ∈ R+ to maximize its product market profit net of fixed costs,
pij(xj,x−j, l)− Fj. This depends on its own and its rivals’ market actions, xj and x−j,
the identity of the owner of the invention, l, and the fixed cost Fj to serve the market.
If firm j owns the invention, and if the project is successful, its fixed cost is F (p).
All other firms have fixed production costs F . This is also the fixed cost of the firm
possessing the invention, in case the invention has failed.
We consider firm j’s action xj as setting either a quantity or a price. We assume that a
unique Nash-Equilibrium x∗ (l) = {x∗j(l), x∗−j(l)} exists at this stage, which is defined
as:
(1− tl)pij(x∗j , x∗−j, l) ≥ (1− tl)pij(xj, x∗−j, l), ∀xj ∈ R+, (3)
where tl is the tax rate on each firm’s profits, which may differ for incumbents (l = i)
and for the entrepreneur (l = e). We assume product market profits to be positive.
From (3), we can define a reduced-form product market profit (before deduction of fixed
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costs) for a firm j, taking as given ownership l:
pij (l) ≡ pij[x∗j (l) , x∗−j(l), l]. (4)
Since incumbents i1, i2, ..., in are symmetric before the acquisition takes place, we need
only distinguish between two types of ownership of the invention: entrepreneurial own-
ership (l = e) and incumbent ownership (l = i). Moreover, since the innovation affects
only fixed production costs, the product market profit before deduction of fixed costs
and taxes is always the same for all active firms in our benchmark model. Hence, there
are only two possible levels of such profits: pi (i) is the profit of each incumbent when
the entrepreneur does not enter the market, whereas pi (e) is the product market profit
of incumbents and the entrepreneur in case of entry.
We assume that market entry by the entrepreneur will reduce the profit of each pro-
ducer due to stronger competition, i.e pi (i) > pi (e) . This assumption is met in standard
models of imperfect competition, such as the basic oligopoly model of quantity com-
petition in a homogeneous good, or the model of price competition with differentiated
products.
3.2 Stage 3: Uncertainty revealed
At this stage, it is revealed whether the innovation turns out to be successful or not,
where ‘success’ can either be interpreted in a technological or in a commercial sense.
For example, this stage may describe the results of mechanical or medical tests, which
determine whether a new, cost-saving technology is feasible. For other innovations,
it may be revealed at this stage whether a small-scale market test shows a sufficient
acceptance among prospective buyers to make the introduction of the new technology
commercially viable.
If the innovation is successful, the superiority of the new product over the existing ones
is reflected in reduced fixed costs of F (p) < F¯ from (1). Under failure, the invention
does not reduce the fixed costs for the owner and fixed production costs remain at F¯ .
If the owner of the invention is an incumbent firm at this stage, then the success or
failure of the innovation has no consequences other than affecting the profits of the
acquiring firm. In contrast, if the entrepreneur decided in the previous stage not to
sell the ownership of the invention, the success or failure of the project will affect her
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decision to enter the market at this stage. We assume that there are entry costs G to
the imperfectly competitive market, which are sufficiently high to render market entry
unprofitable in the case of project failure.
There is a further consideration for the entry decision of the entrepreneur, which derives
from the loss offset provisions for the initial investment outlays I under the corporation
tax. To protect the income tax base and prevent fraud, existing tax codes allow the
deductibility of expenses only in combination with positive income, but do not pay out
negative taxes to the taxable entity in case of a loss.14 Moreover, in the case of project
failure it is also not possible for the entrepreneur to sell her unused tax credit to one of
the incumbents. The reason is that in this case the tax authorities will not accept a link
between an incumbent’s positive income from existing assets and the losses incurred by
the R&D project. Since the tax credit on the investment outlays, tI, is thus lost in case
of non-entry, this term must be included in the entrepreneur’s receipts from entering
the market. With this additional term, and using equation (1), the assumptions that
specify the entry decision of the entrepreneur are formalized in:
Assumption A1: The entrepreneur receives a positive net profit from entering the
market when the innovation is successful, pi (e)− [F¯ −Γ(p)]+ tI−G > 0, but the
net profits from entry are negative when the innovation fails, pi (e)−F¯+tI−G < 0.
Assumption A1 implies that the entrepreneur will not enter the market when unsuc-
cessful, as the receipts are insufficient to cover fixed production and entry costs. Hence,
there will be (n+ 1) firms in the final stage of the game only if the entrepreneur does
not sell the invention in Stage 2, and if the project is successful. The second part in
Assumption A1 also ensures that the initial market structure is stable, since no com-
petitor can profitably enter the market given the existing technology with fixed costs
F¯ and entry cost G.
Note that our sequence of events implies that the entrepreneur cannot sell her firm after
the uncertainty has been lifted. In Section 6.2 we will relax this assumption and show
that if a sale has not already occurred in Stage 2, there will also be no post-uncertainty
sale in Stage 3, no matter whether the project turns out to be successful or not.
14Our static model abstracts from the possibility that the entrepreneur can carry forward the loss
for a certain number of years. Empirical evidence suggests that failed start-ups are rarely able to use
loss carry forward provisions in subsequent years. See Auerbach and Altshuler (1990) and Auerbach
(2006) for empirical evidence documenting the importance of unused tax credits among U.S. firms.
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3.3 Stage 2: Commercialization
In Stage 2, there is an entry-acquisition game where the entrepreneur can decide
whether to sell the invention to one of the incumbents or enter the market at the
fixed cost G, knowing that this is profitable only when the project is successful. The
commercialization process is depicted as an auction where n incumbents simultane-
ously post bids and the entrepreneur then either accepts or rejects these bids. If the
entrepreneur rejects all bids, she will try to enter the market herself. Each incumbent
announces a bid, bi, for the invention and b = (b1, ..bi.., bn) ∈ Rn is the vector of these
bids. Following the announcement of b, the invention may be sold to one of the incum-
bents at the bid price, or remain in the ownership of entrepreneur e. If more than one
bid is accepted, the bidder with the highest bid obtains the invention. If there is more
than one incumbent with such a bid, each such incumbent obtains the invention with
equal probability. The acquisition game is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated
pure strategies. There is a smallest amount, ε, chosen such that all inequalities are
preserved if ε is added or subtracted. To solve the commercialization game, it will be
useful to define ∆e(S) as the net gain for the entrepreneur of selling the invention at a
sales price S, over the alternative of market entry.
As discussed in Section 2, the entrepreneur faces the effective tax rate te in case of
market entry. We assume that this tax is levied at a proportional rate. Investment
costs can be deducted from the tax base when there is positive income, but tax credits
are not paid out when the project fails and the entrepreneur’s income is thus negative.
If the entrepreneur produces for sale, she will be taxed at the tax rate τ on her capital
gains, which are defined as the excess of the sales price over the investment costs. In
this case the acquiring incumbent can always deduct the sales price from its positive
operating profit, irrespective of whether the invention is successful or not. With these
specifications, the entrepreneur’s net gain from selling the invention at price S over the
alternative of market entry is
∆e(S) = S − τ (S − I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net profit from sale
−{p[pi(e)− (F − Γ(p))−G]− pte[pi(e)− (F − Γ(p))−G− I]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net expected profit from entry
}. (5)
From (5), let the reservation price of the entrepreneur be ve = minS, s.t ∆e(S) ≥ 0.
That is, ve is the minimum price S at which the entrepreneur is willing to sell. Solving
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for ∆e(S) = 0, we get:
ve(p) =
(1− te)
(1− τ)
{
p[pi(e)− (F − Γ(p))−G]− (τ − pte)
(1− te) I
}
. (6)
The reservation price ve in (6) gives the entrepreneur’s product market profits, net of
the effective corporate taxes te that she must pay under market entry, but grossed up
by the capital gains tax τ that is due under sale.
Next, we turn to the incumbent firm’s valuations of the invention. When an incumbent
acquires the invention, it is certain that there will only be n firms in the market in the
final stage and hence its reduced product market profit is always given by pi(i). When
not acquiring the entrepreneurial firm, the invention can either remain in the hands
of the entrepreneur (l = e) or it can be acquired by a rival incumbent firm (l = i).
This difference will affect the profits of the non-acquiring incumbent if the invention is
successful, because only in this case will the entrepreneur decide to enter the market.
When the invention fails, the profit of each incumbent will always be pi(i) in the product
market stage, irrespective of the ownership of the invention. The profits of incumbent
firms are taxed at the rate ti.15 Finally, as discussed above, the sales price S is always
tax-deductible for the acquiring firm. Denoting the net gain for an incumbent firm of
acquiring the entrepreneur’s invention at a certain price S by ∆il(S) for l = e, i then
yields
∆il(S) = p(1− ti)
pi(i)− (F − Γ(p))− S︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit with project
− (pi(l)− F)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit without project

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net expected value from a successful innovation
+(1− p)(1− ti)
pi(i)− F − S︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit with project
− (pi(i)− F)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit without project

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net expected value from an unsuccessful innovation
= (1− ti) {−S + pΓ(p) + p[pi(i)− pi(l)]} , (7)
where we have expanded the right-hand side of (7) with ppi(i) to arrive at the final
expression for ∆il(S).
15The tax rate ti will typically exceed the tax rate te faced by the entrepreneur under market entry,
because incumbents are not eligible for reduced tax rates or support schemes tied to small businesses.
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From (7), we can define an incumbent firm’s valuation as vil ≡ maxS, s.t ∆il(S) ≥ 0.
Solving for ∆il(S) = 0 gives vil = pΓ(p) + p[pi(i) − pi(l)] as the maximum price S at
which an incumbent firm is willing to buy the entrepreneur’s invention. Incumbent
firms thus have two valuations: The first is a takeover valuation, which is an incumbent
firm’s value of acquiring the invention when this would otherwise remain in the hands
of the entrepreneur. In this case l = e and
vie(p) = pΓ(p) + p[pi(i)− pi(e)], (8)
where pΓ(p) is the expected fixed costs savings of the invention and p[pi(i)− pi(e)] > 0
is the expected increase in product market profits when the entrepreneur is prevented
from entering the market.
The second valuation is a competitive valuation, which is an incumbent firm’s value of
acquiring the invention when a rival incumbent firm would otherwise obtain it. Then
l = i and
vii(p) = pΓ(p). (9)
Since the invention only affects fixed production costs, the preemptive value is in this
case simply the expected fixed costs savings of the invention. Comparing (8) and (9),
it is obvious that vie > vii since pi(i) > pi(e). This describes the concentration effect
of an acquisition when entry by the entrepreneur is prevented. Finally, note that the
incumbent firms’ valuations are unaffected by their profit tax rate ti, because compet-
itive bidding ensures that the equilibrium sales price will equal the expected increase
in profits from acquiring the invention.
We can now proceed to solve for the Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS). Since
incumbents are symmetric and vie > vii always holds, there are three different regimes
that we need to consider. These are summarized in Table 2. The following lemma can
then be stated:
Lemma 1 The equilibrium ownership of the invention l∗ and the acquisition price S∗
are described in Table 2.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Table 2 describes the equilibrium mode of commercialization as a function of the R&D
project chosen by the entrepreneur in the first stage, characterized by its success prob-
ability p. In Regime 1 (R1 for short), the expected profit from entering the market
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Table 2: The equilibrium ownership structure and the acquisition price
Regime Definition Ownership Acquisition price
R1 : ve(p) > vie(p) > vii(p) l
∗ = e –
R2 : vie(p) > ve(p) > vii(p) l
∗ = i S∗ = ve(p)
R3 : vie(p) > vii(p) > ve(p) l
∗ = i S∗ = vii(p)
is higher for the entrepreneur than selling the invention to one of the incumbents. In
Regime 2 the entrepreneur will sell her invention, but the sales price will be determined
by the reservation price ve of the entrepreneur. This is because if one incumbent firm
bids the reservation price, all other incumbents will only be willing to bid the com-
petitive valuation, which is below ve in this regime. Hence, the equilibrium bid equals
the reservation price of the entrepreneur. In Regime 3, the invention is also sold in
equilibrium, but the price equals the competitive valuation vii. Since all incumbents
are simultaneously willing to bid this price, it is also the equilibrium sales price in
Regime 3, where one of the incumbents is drawn as the acquirer.
Note that the gains from an entry deterring acquisition in Regime 2 are unevenly
distributed among incumbents, as the acquiring incumbent bears the cost of the en-
try deterrence while the other firms can free-ride on the acquisition. This raises the
possibility of coordination failures among incumbents, if vie(p) > ve(p) > vii(p). If
a coordination failure occurs, the entrepreneur may enter the market even though
vie(p) > ve(p). This can be shown by extending the acquisition auction to allow for
mixed strategy equilibria. In a mixed strategy equilibrium incumbents can bid ve(p)
with some probability. There are then two possible outcomes. In the first, at least one
incumbent bids ve(p) and an entry deterring acquisition takes place. In the second, no
incumbent bids for the project and the entrepreneur enters the market.
3.4 Stage 1: Project choice by the entrepreneur
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium project selected by the entrepreneur, given
that she anticipates the mode of commercialization in the second stage of the game.
Since the rewards differ across regimes, the equilibrium project chosen by the entre-
preneur has to be determined independently for each regime. Noting that investment
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costs I are independent of project choice, the entrepreneur simply chooses the project
that maximizes the net reward in each regime. From Lemma 1 the net reward for the
entrepreneur, denoted by Ω∗(p), can be written as
Ω∗(p) =

(1− te)p [pi(e)− (F¯ − Γ)−G]− (1− pte)I ≡ (1− τ)[ve(p)− I] in R1
(1− τ)[ve(p)− I] in R2
(1− τ)[vii(p)− I] in R3.
(10)
Note that in Regime 1 the net reward equals the entrepreneur’s net expected profit
from entry, as given in the second line of eq. (5). By the construction of the reservation
price ve in (6), however, this is equal to the net reward in the (hypothetical) situation
where the entrepreneur receives a sales price ve and pays capital gains taxes on the
excess of this sales price over the investment costs I. This is also how the net reward
is calculated in Regimes 2 and 3, where the sale actually takes place.
To derive the equilibrium project choices we start with Regime 3, where the entrepre-
neur sells her invention at price S∗ = vii(p). In this regime, the net reward is maximized
by incorporating the corporate tax treatment of the incumbent firms. From eq. (10), the
entrepreneur will choose the project p∗S = argmaxp(1− τ)(vii(p)− I) = argmaxp vii(p),
where the subscript S stands for the project choice in the sales Regime 3. The associ-
ated first-order condition is:
Γ(p∗S) + p
∗
SΓ
′(p∗S) = 0. (11)
Since incumbents can fully deduct the investment costs from their taxable profits, the
corporation tax is a lump-sum instrument in this regime. From the perspective of the
entrepreneur, the sales price is therefore maximized by choosing the efficient project
that maximizes the expected fixed cost reduction, as given by pˆ in equation (2).
Next, we consider the optimal project choice in Regimes 1 and 2. In Regime 1 the
entrepreneur enters the market herself, whereas in Regime 2 she sells the invention,
but the sales price is determined by her reservation price ve (the expected profits in
case of entry). In both regimes, the net reward Ω∗ = (1−τ)[ve(p)−I] is thus maximized
by incorporating the loss offset provisions that apply to the entrepreneur. The optimal
project is given from p∗E = argmaxp(1 − τ)[ve(p) − I] = argmaxp ve(p), where the
project choice is denoted by the subscript E. The associated first-order condition is
Γ(p∗E) + p
∗
EΓ
′(p∗E) = G− [pi(e)− F ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
− t
e
(1− te)I︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
. (12)
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The two non-zero terms on the right-hand side of (12) show that in Regimes 1 and 2,
the entrepreneur will not generally choose the efficient project pˆ defined in (2). The
first term on the RHS is positive from Assumption A1. Other things equal, this effect
leads to the choice of a project that is more risky, relative to the one under sale. The
reason is that by choosing a more risky project, the entrepreneur reduces the expected
value of entry costs G, which must be paid only when the project is successful (and
hence the entrepreneur enters the market). On the other hand, the second term on the
RHS of (12) is negative for a positive level of the corporation tax. This effect arises
because the entrepreneur cannot deduct her investment costs from tax in the case of
project failure. Other things equal, this will induce her to choose a project with an
inefficiently low level of risk. Note that this last effect is the stronger, the higher is the
effective tax rate te faced by the entrepreneur in case of market entry.
The equilibrium project choices in the different regimes are shown in the lower panel
(ii) of Figure 2. In Regime 3, the equilibrium project choice is at S. This is efficient as
a small increase in the success probability p of the project would yield zero changes in
expected fixed cost savings. The two possible cases that can arise in Regimes 1 and 2
are shown by the project choices E1 and E2, where the tax rates corresponding to these
regimes are related by te1 > t
e
2. At E1 the negative effect on the RHS of (12) dominates
and the chosen level of p is too high, so that a decrease in the success probability of
the project would generate additional expected costs savings. At E2 the opposite is
true and p should be raised in order to maximize expected cost savings from a social
perspective.
4 The effects of tax policy
In this section, we analyze how the system of taxing and subsidizing entrepreneurial
incomes affects the mode of commercialization and the project choice by the entre-
preneur. We focus on exogenous variations in the effective rate of profit taxation that
the entrepreneur faces in case of market entry. To simplify the notation, we drop the
superscript e for this tax rate from here on, so that t ≡ te. In this analysis, we hold
constant the capital gains tax rate τ , which is levied in the case of project sale. To
ensure that all possible regimes derived in the preceding section can occur, we assume
that market entry must be the entrepreneur’s preferred mode of commercialization
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when t = 0. Effectively, this requires that τ must not be too low, relative to the entry
costs G. This is formally stated in:
Assumption A2: When t = 0, the entrepreneur’s reservation value exceeds the in-
cumbents’ takeover valuation, i.e. ve(p
∗
E)|t=0 > vie(p∗E)|t=0.
On the other hand, if the entrepreneur faced the same tax rate under the two modes
of commercialization, she would always choose to sell her invention to an incumbent
firm. This is seen from setting τ = t in (6), yielding
ve(p)|t=τ = pΓ + p[pi(e)− F¯ −G]−
t(1− p)
(1− t) I < vii = pΓ, ∀p ∈ [0, 1], (13)
where p[pi(e)− F¯ −G] < 0 from Assumption A1. In this case, the reservation value of
market entry for the entrepreneur falls short of the competitive valuation by incum-
bents. This implies that, in equilibrium, the entrepreneur sells her invention at the
price vii. By selling the invention, the entrepreneur saves both the entry costs G and
the additional tax payments that result from the inability to deduct the investment
costs in case of project failure. Since selling the invention yields at least the expected
payoff of the invention in the competitive bidding auction modeled here, there are no
offsetting benefits from market entry when tax rates are equal under the two alternative
modes of commercialization.16
In the following, we therefore consider effective profit tax rates t for the entrepreneur,
which range from zero to the capital gains tax rate τ . From our discussion in Section 2,
raising t towards τ is equivalent to a policy that reduces tax concessions and specific
subsidies exclusively granted to small firms. To proceed, we introduce two critical
corporate tax rates tED and tC , where the valuation of the project by the entrepreneur
equals the entry deterring (or takeover) valuation and the competitive valuation by the
incumbents, respectively.
Definition 2: Let tED be defined from ve(p
∗
E)|t=tED = vie(p∗E)|t=tED , and let tC be
defined from ve(p
∗
E)|t=tC = vii(p∗E)|t=tC .
The following proposition describes how the commercialization mode depends on the
tax rate.
16In this case, a trade-off for the commercialization decision of the entrepreneur can still arise,
however, when selling the invention to the incumbents is associated with high transaction costs. This
case is analyzed in Section 6.3 below.
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Proposition 1 : Assume that tED and tC exist. Then: (i) commercialization by entry
(Regime 1) occurs, if the effective rate of profit taxation is low, t ∈ [0, tED); (ii) com-
mercialization by sale occurs at the sales price S∗ = ve (Regime 2), if the profit tax rate
is in the intermediate range t ∈ [tED, tC); (iii) commercialization by sale occurs at the
sales price S∗ = vii (Regime 3), if the profit tax rate is sufficiently high, t ∈ [tC , 1].
Proposition 1, in turn, leads to a proposition describing how project choice depends on
the tax rate. For this purpose, we need to introduce a further critical tax rate.
Definition 3: Let t˜ be the tax rate where the entrepreneur just chooses the socially
efficient project in Regimes 1 and 2, i.e. [Γ(p∗E) + p
∗
EΓ
′(p∗E)]|t=t˜ = 0.
We then get:
Proposition 2 : Suppose that Proposition 1 holds and t˜ exists. Then: (i) when the
profit tax rate is very low, t < t˜ < tC, the entrepreneur chooses a project that has a
lower success probability than the project that minimizes expected costs, popt = p∗E < pˆ;
(ii) for an intermediate range of tax rates t˜ < t < tC, the entrepreneur chooses a project
with a higher success probability than the efficient one, popt = p∗E > pˆ; (iii) for high tax
rates t > tC, the entrepreneur’s project choice is efficient, popt = p∗S = pˆ.
Project choice and taxes. Let us first prove Proposition 2. Consider the effects of
a change in t on project choice, taking as given how taxes affect the commercialization
mode. Implicitly differentiating (11) in Regime 3 and (12) in Regimes 1 and 2 yields
dpopt
dt
=

−I
(2Γ′ + p∗EΓ′′)(1− t)2
> 0 in R1, R2,
0 in R3,
(14)
where 2Γ′ + p∗EΓ
′′ < 0 follows from the assumption that pΓ(p) is strictly concave.
********* Figure 3 about here **********
The upper panel of Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the effective corporate
tax rate t and the equilibrium project choice, as characterized by the success probability
p. From Proposition 1 (and thus anticipating the proof below), Regime 1 arises for
low effective corporate tax rates t < tED, Regime 2 arises for intermediate tax rates
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tED < t < tC , and Regime 3 arises for high tax rates t > tC . To interpret panel (i)
of Figure 3, recall from our discussion of eq. (12) that there are two counteracting
effects, in general, which may cause the entrepreneur’s project choice to differ from
the efficient project pˆ. At t = 0 the negative effect on the RHS of (12) is absent and
the chosen project is therefore unambiguously too risky. As t is increased, the success
probability of the equilibrium project continuously rises throughout Regimes 1 and 2,
dp∗E/dt > 0 [see eq. (14)]. This is because the rise in t makes the deductibility of
the initial investment outlays more valuable, but this deductibility can only be used
when the project is successful. To determine at which tax rate the equilibrium project
switches to one with too little risk, we solve for the tax rate t˜ where the right-hand-side
of (12) equals zero. This yields
t˜ =
−[pi(e)− F −G]
[I − (pi(e)− F −G)] < 1. (15)
Note that the numerator in (15) is positive since pi(e)−F−G < 0 from Assumption A1.
For the same reason, the denominator is also positive and larger in absolute size than
the numerator. Hence, there is a critical tax rate t˜ < 1, beyond which a project with
an inefficiently low risk is chosen, if the relevant valuation of the invention is ve and
thus the critical tax rate t˜ is still in Regimes 1 or 2. In Figure 3, we assume that this
is indeed the case.
In Regime 3, the entrepreneur sells the invention at price S∗ = vii and the optimal
project choice is independent of the effective profit tax rate, dp∗S/dt = 0. Overall,
therefore, the equilibrium level of p adjusts in a non-monotonous way to the profit
tax rate t, rising continuously throughout Regimes 1 and 2 and then dropping to the
efficient level p∗S = pˆ at the switch to Regime 3.
Commercialization mode and taxes. Let us now prove Proposition 1. Panel (iii)
of Figure 3 depicts the valuations ve(p
opt), vie(p
opt) and vii(p
opt) as functions of the
profit tax rate t. All valuations incorporate the optimal project choice popt, which is
given by
popt =
{
p∗E, t ∈ [0, tC),
p∗S, t ∈ [tC , 1].
(16)
To see how the different valuations depend on the profit tax rate, we need to determine
both the direct effect of t and the indirect effect through the optimal project choice
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popt in (16):
dvr(p
opt)
dt
=
∂vr
∂t︸︷︷︸
direct effect
+
∂vr
∂p
dpopt
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
∀ r ∈ {e, ie, ii}. (17)
We start by evaluating eq. (17) for the entrepreneur’s reservation price ve, as given
in (6). In Regimes 1 and 2, which arise for t < tC , the indirect effect in (17) is zero
due to the envelope theorem, ∂ve/∂p = 0. In Regime 3, which occurs for t > t
C , the
indirect effect is also zero because dpopt/dt = 0 from eqs. (16) and (11). Hence, within
each regime, only the direct effect ∂ve/∂t is operative. Therefore:
∂ve(p
opt)
∂t
=
−popt
(1− τ)
{
pi(e)− [F − Γ(popt)]−G− I} < 0, (18)
where the term in curly brackets is positive since the entrepreneur must earn a positive
net reward on her investment when the project is successful. It follows that within
each regime, the entrepreneur’s reservation price ve(p
opt) is monotonously falling in the
profit tax rate t. This can be seen in panel (iii) of Figure 3.17
Let us now turn to the valuations of incumbents, vil. The direct effect of t on both vie
and vii is zero from (8) and (9), so we must have ∂vil/∂t = 0 in eq. (17). Then, note
that the indirect effect in eq. (17) consists of the induced changes in project choice, as
given in (14), and the incumbents’ valuation of these changes, ∂vil/∂p.
18 The latter are
relevant only in Regimes 1 and 2 and are given by
∂vie
∂p
= Γ + p∗EΓ
′ + pi(i)− pi(e), ∂vii
∂p
= Γ + p∗EΓ
′. (19)
For low levels of taxes t ∈ [0, t˜), both of these terms are unambiguously positive
from (12) and the assumption that pi(i) > pi(e). As the profit tax rate rises beyond
t˜, further increases in t (and thus p) have a negative effect on vii and an ambiguous
effect on vie. At the switch to Regime 3 at t = t
C , there is a jump in the valuation of
incumbents due to the discrete change in optimal project choice from eq. (16). Thus, as
shown by panel (iii) of Figure 3, the competitive valuation vii(p
opt) is first increasing in
t and reaches a local maximum in point B for t = t˜. It then decreases until the switch
17Note that the envelope theorem can only be used in Regimes 1 and 2, where the optimal project
chosen by the entrepreneur is based on the maximization of ve. Hence, if the project choice changes
discretely at the tax rate tC , the value of ve may exhibit a jump at this point.
18The envelope theorem can not be applied to determine the effect of t on the incumbents’ valuations,
because the project is not chosen to maximize vie or vii in Regimes 1 and 2.
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to Regime 3 at t = tC , where vii jumps up to vii(p
∗
S) > vii(p
∗
E). The takeover valuation
vie(p
opt) has a similar overall pattern and will also exhibit a jump at t = tC .
The equilibrium commercialization pattern is shown by panel (ii) of Figure 3. When
the corporate tax rate is low, t ∈ (0, tED), the entry value ve exceeds the incumbents’
takeover valuation vie. This leads to an equilibrium in Regime 1 with the entrepreneur
retaining the ownership of her invention and entering the market in case the invention
succeeds. As the profit tax rate increases, it reaches the first critical value, denoted
tED, where the entrepreneur’s reservation value equals the takeover valuation of the
incumbents. At t = tED, the equilibrium switches to Regime 2 with an entry deterring
acquisition taking place at the acquisition price S∗ = ve. Other incumbents will not
preempt a rival’s acquisition in the range t ∈ [tED, tC), since the net value of preemption
is negative, vii − ve < 0. As t rises further, it reaches the second critical level, denoted
t = tC , where the entrepreneur’s reservation value falls to the competitive valuation of
the incumbent firms. This induces a bidding war between incumbents and results in
Regime 3 where the sales price of the invention is fixed by the competitive valuation
of the incumbents. Further increases in t continue to reduce the entry value of the
entrepreneur, which falls to zero at tmax < 1 as a result of the fixed entry costs G. ¤
The trade-off for tax policy. From Propositions 1 and 2, a basic trade-off for
tax policy becomes apparent. Government policies that reduce the effective profit tax
rate by granting reduced tax rates and capital subsidies to small businesses encourage
market entry and foster competition. At the same time, however, the entrepreneur’s
choice of project will be distorted whenever she produces for entry.19 As shown in
panel (i) of Figure 3, when profit tax rates are in an intermediate range t ∈ {t˜, tC},
even risk-neutral entrepreneurs will choose projects that involve too little risk and fall
short of maximizing the expected return from the investment. This effect arises from
the imperfect loss offset that entrepreneurs face in case of project failure. Very low tax
rates t < t˜ would instead involve excessive risk-taking by entrepreneurs, but such low
tax rates are often not feasible (or not desirable) for other reasons. In particular, if tax
and subsidy discrimination in favor of small, entrepreneurial firms becomes very strong,
this creates powerful incentives for larger firms to outsource some of their operations
into small, independent units, in order to free-ride on these advantages.
19This is also true when a mixed strategy equilibrium results in Regime 2, as a result of a coordi-
nation failure between incumbents. Recall our discussion at the end of Section 3.3.
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In contrast, when market entry by entrepreneurs is not placed at a tax advantage in
comparison to selling the invention to an established firm, then market concentration
remains high. However, entrepreneurs producing for sale at the competition valuation
of incumbents will anticipate that their sales price incorporates a complete loss offset
and hence, they will carry out projects with efficient risk and return characteristics.
Thus, holding other instruments constant, government policy towards small firms has
to make a choice between the goals of competition policy on the one hand, and fostering
‘breakthrough’ inventions on the other.
Finally, we briefly turn to the capital gains tax, which has so far been held constant.
Differentiating ve in (6) with respect to τ and noting that indirect effects through the
choice of p are absent in all regimes yields
dve
dτ
=
∂ve
∂τ
=
(1− t)popt[pi(e)− (F − Γ(popt))−G]− (1− pt)I
(1− τ)2 > 0. (20)
This is positive whenever the investment has a positive expected return, even if the
asymmetric treatment of positive and negative income under the corporation tax is
accounted for. Hence, an increase in τ shifts the graph of ve upwards in panel (iii) of
Figure 3, moving the cut-off tax levels tED and tC to the right. This implies that an
increase in the capital gains tax rate raises the likelihood that the innovator enters the
market, by making it less attractive for her to sell the invention to incumbent firms.
At the same time, however, optimal project choices are also affected by this shift.
Accordingly, an increase in τ widens the range of effective corporate tax rates t for
which the entrepreneur chooses an inefficient project in equilibrium.
5 Variable cost saving inventions
In our benchmark model, innovations only reduced the fixed costs of production but
left the marginal costs unchanged. One implication of this is that consumers will always
prefer commercialization by entry, even though this commercialization mode will typ-
ically lead to inefficient project choices (see Proposition 2). The reason is that market
entry by the entrepreneur increases competition and lowers consumer prices. In con-
trast, the gains from an efficient project choice only accrue to the entrepreneur, but do
not benefit consumers because product market choices will depend only on marginal
costs.
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A full analysis of the welfare effects of tax policy is outside the scope of this paper.
In this section, we show, however, that if more risky projects are associated with
larger reductions in variable costs (or improvements in quality), consumers may prefer
commercialization by sale over commercialization by entry. For this purpose we briefly
discuss how the analysis in the different stages of the game changes when variable cost
reductions are allowed for.
Stage 4: Consider a situation where the invention reduces the variable cost, while
fixed costs are ignored. Hence the gains from a more risky project in case of success
are now given by larger variable cost savings for the possessor of the invention. Let
the acquiring incumbent’s product market profit for a successful invention be piA (i, p),
where p is the project choice in Stage 1. Similarly, let the entrepreneur’s profit when
entering be piE (e, p) and let a non-acquiring incumbent’s profit be piNA (l, p). We then
introduce
Assumption A3: (i)
dpiA (i, p)
dp
< 0,
dpiE (e, p)
dp
< 0, (ii)
dpiNA (l, p)
dp
> 0, l = {e, i} .
Assumption A.3 (i) states that the product market profit from a successful inven-
tion is smaller for the possessor (either the acquiring incumbent or the entrepreneur
herself) when the riskiness of the project decreases. Assumption A.3 (ii) states that
non-acquiring incumbents see their profits increasing when the possessor has a safer
project, since rivals then face less fierce competition from the owner of the invention.
These assumptions will, for instance, hold for a process innovation where a more risky
innovation leads to a larger reduction in the marginal cost of selling and producing for
the product market.
Stage 3: At this stage, it is again revealed whether the innovation turns out to be
successful. We maintain Assumption A1 so that entry is only profitable if the project
succeeds. Hence piE (e, p)−G+ tI > 0, but piE (e)−G+ tI < 0, where piE (e) denotes
the profit the entrepreneur would attain under entry with a failed project.
Stage 2: At the commercialization stage, the entrepreneur’s reservation price defined
in (6) becomes:
ve =
(1− t)
(1− τ)
{
p[piE(e, p)−G]− (τ − pt)
(1− t) I
}
, (21)
where piE(e, p) is the profit of the entrepreneur under entry with project p.
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The takeover valuation and the competitive valuations of an incumbent defined in (8)
and (9) become
vie = p [piA(i, p)− piNA(e, p)] , vii = p [piA(i, p)− piNA(i, p)] , (22)
where again vie > vii since piNA(e, p) < piNA(i, p). From the latter inequality, it follows
that the equilibrium commercialization mode can be solved by applying Lemma 1.
Stage 1: Turning to the entrepreneur’s project choice, we assume that ppiE(e, p) and
p [piA(i, p)− piNA(l, p)] are strictly concave in p, ensuring well-defined project choices.
Introducing E[pi(l, p)] ≡ ppi(l, p) as the expected value of the project, the first-order
condition for the optimal project choice when innovating for entry or selling at the
reservation price S∗ = ve in Regimes 1 and 2 becomes:
dE[piE(e, p)]
dp
= 0 =⇒ piE(e, p∗E) + p∗E
dpiE(e, p
∗
E)
dp
= G− t
(1− t) I . (23)
As in our benchmark model [see eq. (12)] the entrepreneur’s choice of project will
deviate from the project that maximizes her expected product market profits ppiE(.)
by two effects: the existence of entry costs will make her more willing to choose a risky
project, whereas the inability to deduct the investment costs from tax in case of failure
will induce her to choose a safer project, other things being equal.
When innovating for sale under bidding competition in Regime 3, receiving the sale
price S∗ = vii [see eq. (11)], the optimal project choice is given by
dE[piA(i, p)]
dp
−dE[piNA(i, p)]
dp
= piA(i, p
∗
S)+p
∗
S
dpiA(i, p
∗
S)
dp
−piNA(i, p∗S)−p∗S
dpiNA(i, p
∗
S)
dp
= 0.
(24)
The optimal project choice in Regime 3 is again independent of the effective tax rate.
There is, however, an important difference to our benchmark case. With variable cost
reductions, an entrepreneur that chooses an optimal project for sale will not only
consider how the expected product market profit of the acquirer is affected, but she
will also take into account that choosing a safer project increases the expected profit
for a non-acquirer (see Assumption A3). Since the incumbents’ willingness to pay for
the project is negatively affected by the profits of a non-acquirer [see eq. (22)], this
gives a strategic incentive to the entrepreneur to choose a more risky project.
This strategic incentive is shown in the lower panel (ii) of Figure 4, where the slope of
the marginal expected profit curve from a change in p is always steeper in Regime 3
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as compared to Regimes 1 and 2. For this reason the equilibrium project chosen in
Regime 3 is very likely to be riskier than the project chosen in Regimes 1 and 2, no
matter which of the counteracting effects on the RHS of (23) dominates in the latter
regimes (p∗S < p
∗
E2
< p∗E1).
********* Figure 4 about here **********
The effects of tax policy on consumers. Let us now examine how effective tax
rates affect consumers through the entrepreneur’s choice of project and the mode of
commercialization. Maintaining Assumption A2, we proceed as in Section 4 and define
reduced-form valuations vr(t) ≡ vr(popt(t)). Taking the total derivative in effective taxes
t and applying the envelope theorem, it is straightforward to show that Propositions 1
and 2 are also fulfilled when more risky projects are associated with larger variable
cost reductions.
Consider now the upper panel (i) of Figure 4. Let CS be the consumer surplus when
the invention has failed. The expected consumer surplus under innovation by entry and
under innovation by sale is then E[CS(e, p)] ≡ pCS(e, p)+(1−p)CS and E[CS(i, p)] ≡
pCS(i, p)+(1−p)CS, respectively. For the same project p, innovation by entry always
gives a higher expected consumer surplus since CS(e, p) > CS(i, p) from the concen-
tration effect of an acquisition. Assume that the expected consumer surplus is strictly
concave in p, so that there exist optimal projects pCSS = argmaxp[pCS(p, i)+(1−p)C¯S]
and pCSE = argmaxp[pCS(p, e) + (1 − p)C¯S] from the perspective of consumers. Note
that, because of imperfect competition in the product market, the interests of produc-
ers and consumers are generally not aligned in our model. As shown in panel (i) of
Figure 4, the entrepreneur will therefore – regardless of entry mode – not choose a
project that maximizes the expected consumer surplus, so that in general p∗E 6= pCSE
and p∗S 6= pCSS holds.
Suppose that we start from a high effective corporate tax rate for the entrepreneur,
t > tC . From Proposition 1, this implies that the entrepreneur will choose commercial-
ization by sale at the sales price S∗ = vii. This yields an expected consumer surplus of
E[CS(e, p∗S)], as shown by point S in Figure 4 (i). Suppose then that the effective tax
rate is reduced to t1 < t
C so that the entrepreneur chooses instead commercialization
by entry. If the new effective tax rate t1 is larger than some tax rate tˆ, where tˆ is
the tax rate for which the RHS of (23) is zero, then the entrepreneur will choose an
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overly safe project under market entry, due to the incomplete loss offset provisions of
the corporate tax code. This project choice, however, yields only limited reductions
in variable costs, and hence consumer prices, in case it succeeds. A comparison of the
points S and E1 in Figure 4 (i) reveals that the expected consumer surplus will be lower
under market entry than under sale, E[CS(e, p∗E1)] < E[CS(i, p
∗
S)], even though the
number of competitors is higher with market entry by the entrepreneur.
If, instead, the effective tax rate were further lowered to the level t2, then the distorting
effect of limited loss offset provisions would be mitigated and the entrepreneur would
choose the project characterized by p∗E2 . With this project choice, expected consumer
surplus might then be higher under market entry than under sale, as shown by the
comparison of the points E2 and S. As we have discussed in the previous section,
however, such large corporate tax reductions might not be desirable, because they
create strong incentives for larger firms to free-ride on these tax advantages.
6 Discussion and further extensions
In this section, we discuss our results further by introducing several other extensions
or modifications of our benchmark model.
6.1 Stage 0: Entrepreneurial choice of effort
An important aspect of entrepreneurial innovation not covered by our benchmark model
is that a substantial share of the initial investment may consist of effort put in by the
entrepreneur. We incorporate this aspect by introducing a zero stage of the game
where the entrepreneur chooses an endogenous level of effort, denoted by ρ, in order to
generate a basic innovative idea. We then study how taxes affect this choice variable.
The entrepreneur’s effort level ρ determines the probability of succeeding with a basic
invention that is necessary for being able to start an R&D project in Stage 1. For
simplicity, assume that the probability of succeeding with a basic invention is simply
the effort, i.e. ρ ∈ [0, 1], and that effort is associated with an increasing and convex
cost y(ρ), i.e. y′(ρ) > 0, and y′′(ρ) > 0. Efforts are not deductible when paying taxes.
Then, let Ω∗(popt) be the reduced-form expected profit given from equation (10). Define
Π = ρΩ∗(popt)− y(ρ) as the expected net profit of a basic invention. The optimal effort
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level ρ∗ is then given from:
dΠ
dρ
= Ω∗(popt)− y′(ρ∗) = 0, (25)
with the associated second-order condition d2Π/dρ2 = −y′′(ρ) < 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem in (25), we can state the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 The equilibrium effort by the entrepreneur in stage 0, ρ∗, and hence the
probability of succeeding with a basic invention, increases in the net reward for the
invention, i.e. dρ∗/dΩ∗(popt) > 0.
To determine the effects of taxes on the entrepreneur’s effort level, we start with the
effective corporate tax rate t. Note from eq. (10) that the reduced-form net reward
is Ω∗(p∗E) = (1 − τ)[ve(p∗E) − I] for t ∈ [0, tC ], and Ω∗(p∗S) = (1 − τ)[vii(p∗S) − I] for
t > tC . The reservation price is decreasing in corporate taxes from eq. (18), whereas the
competitive valuation of incumbents is independent of corporate taxes from eq. (17).
Thus, it follows that an increase in corporate tax only decreases the incentives to
provide effort when corporate taxes are so low that an equilibrium in Regime 1 or 2
results. In contrast, if corporate taxes are sufficiently high so that a sale takes place
under bidding competition (Regime 3), the net reward is independent of corporate
taxes. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
********* Figure 5 about here **********
Turning to the capital gains tax τ , differentiating the net reward Ω∗(p∗l ) in (10) with
respect to τ , using (6) and once more noting that indirect effects through the choice
of p are absent in all regimes yields
dΩ∗(p∗E)
dτ
= 0 for t ∈ [0, tC ] (26)
dΩ∗(p∗S)
dτ
=
∂Ω∗(p∗S)
∂τ
= −[vii(p∗S)− I] < 0 for t > tC . (27)
Hence, an increase in the capital gains tax reduces the net reward for the innovation
in Regime 3, but not in Regimes 1 and 2. Using Lemma 2, we can then summarize our
results as follows:
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Proposition 3 Increased corporate taxes (in Regimes 1 and 2) and increased capital
gains taxes (in Regime 3) reduce the effort to create innovative ideas.
Proposition 3 shows that the disincentive effects of a particular tax on entrepreneurial
effort will generally depend on the commercialization mode in our model. This com-
plements existing results in the literature which have emphasized the effort-reducing
effects of capital gains taxes, in particular, but not in a setting with an endogenous
commercialization choice (e.g. Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2004).
6.2 Post uncertainty sale
As illustrated in Figure 1, our benchmark model assumes that the entrepreneur can only
sell the invention in Stage 2. Hence, we have ruled out the option for the entrepreneur
to sell the invention after the uncertainty has been lifted in Stage 3. In this section, we
demonstrate that such post-uncertainty sales will not occur in equilibrium.
If the project is revealed to be a success at the beginning of Stage 3, this informa-
tion is private and cannot be credibly revealed to incumbents. The superiority of the
entrepreneur’s cost structure can only be verified in Stage 4, when the profits from
product market interaction become public information through accounting laws and
accounting standards. We proceed to show that if an acquisition has not occurred in
Stage 2, there will not be an acquisition post-uncertainty in Stage 3. We assume that
the acquisition auction in Stage 3 is once more a first-price perfect information auction
with externalities and solve for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. The
entrepreneur’s net gain from selling the invention at price S over the alternative of
market entry is now
∆e(S) = S − τ (S − I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net profit from sale
−{[pi(e)− (F − Γ(p∗))−G]− t[pi(e)− (F − Γ(p∗))−G− I]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net expected profit from entry
}. (28)
Solving for ∆e(S) = 0, we obtain the reservation price post-uncertainty in Stage 3:
we(p) =
(1− t)
(1− τ)
{
[pi(e)− (F − Γ(p∗))−G]− (τ − t)
(1− t)I
}
. (29)
Comparing (29) and (6) shows that we(p) > ve(p): the reservation price of the entrepre-
neur has risen because the success probability is one from her point of view. However,
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incumbents cannot infer the quality of the project so that their valuations remain at
vie and vii, as defined in (8) and (9). If no acquisition occurred in Stage 2, this implies
that ve > vie > vii. But then, an acquisition in Stage 3 cannot be profitable from
we(p) > ve.
6.3 Innovation for sale and incorporation
We have assumed that entrepreneurs that innovate for sale never incorporate. In prac-
tice, we observe that some entrepreneurs incorporate before selling their invention.
What would be the effect of allowing entrepreneurs that innovate for sale to incorpo-
rate, in order to face a lower tax rate?
For analytical simplicity, we focus on the extreme case where tax rates are identical
when innovating for market entry or for sale, i.e. t = τ .20 In order to still have a trade-
off between market entry and sale in this case, we add a tax-deductible transaction cost
T for incumbents when acquiring. This cost could correspond to, for instance, legal fees
and due diligence.
An incumbent’s net gain then becomes:
∆il(S) = p(1− ti)
pi(i)− (F − Γ(p))− S︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from buying
− T − (pi(l)− F)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from not buying

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net expected value from a successful innovation
+(1− p)(1− ti)
pi(i)− F − S︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from buying
− T − (pi(i)− F)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from not buying

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net expected value from an unsuccessful innovation
= (1− ti) {−S − T + pΓ(p) + p[pi(i)− pi(l)]} . (30)
Then, use that an incumbent firm’s valuation is vil ≡ maxS, s.t ∆il(S) ≥ 0. Solving for
∆il(S) = 0 gives vil = pΓ(p) + p[pi(i)− pi(l)]− T as the maximum price S at which an
incumbent firm is willing to buy the entrepreneur’s invention. The takeover valuation
and the competition valuation are
vie(p) = pΓ(p) + p[pi(i)− pi(e)]− T, vii(p) = pΓ(p)− T. (31)
20Hence the specification in this section ignores the fact that some of the tax breaks or subsidies
are only available for entrepreneurs when they actually enter the market.
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Note that the fixed cost T has no effect on the optimal project choices in eq. (16).
Hence, the entrepreneur’s reservation price is once more given by (6), which simplifies
to
ve(p)|t=τ = pΓ + p[pi(e)− F¯ −G]−
t(1− p)
(1− t) I. (32)
It then directly follows from eqs. (31)-(32) that if transaction costs T become suffi-
ciently large, the reservation price of the entrepreneur will be higher than incumbents’
valuations, even if t = τ . This holds in equilibrium when we incorporate optimal project
choices, which are unaffected by transaction costs and given in eq. (16).21 Hence, when
the entrepreneur produces for entry, she will still choose an inefficient project. More-
over, the equilibrium project is again more likely to bear too little risk, if the tax rate t
is sufficiently high and the effect of incomplete loss offset provisions is thus important.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have focused on two important decision margins of entrepreneurs
that have received little analysis so far in a context of public policies. These are the
decision of the entrepreneur to choose between projects with different risk and return
characteristics, and her decision of how to commercialize the innovation. In this frame-
work government policies to support small, technology-intensive businesses by means
of reduced corporate tax rates and various subsidy programs promote market entry
by entrepreneurs over the alternative of selling out the innovation to incumbent firms.
At the same time, however, the entrepreneur’s choice of innovation project will be dis-
torted whenever she produces for entry, due to the existence of both limited loss offset
provisions and market entry costs. This points to a basic trade-off for the government
between an entry-promoting competition policy in technology-intensive markets, and
the goal of fostering innovations that maximize expected cost reductions. The impor-
tance of entrepreneurs making socially efficient project choices is greatest in a setting
where innovations lead to reductions in variable costs, so that cost savings are passed
on to consumers in the industry equilibrium.
Our analysis holds several testable implications. As corporate tax reductions have been
enacted in many countries over the last two decades and incentive schemes for small
21This can be illustrated in panel (iii) of Figure 3, where transaction costs would merely shift down
the locus of the takeover valuation vie(popt) and the competitive valuation vii(popt).
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businesses have proliferated, there has been a rising tax advantage for market entry
by entrepreneurs over the alternative of project sale. According to our analysis, these
developments should have led to a rising share of innovations that are commercialized
by the market entry of entrepreneurs. At the same time, these development should
have led to less risky - and perhaps also smaller - innovation projects.
Our results can be contrasted with existing policies to support entrepreneurship in the
European Union and elsewhere. Existing EU policies, for example, focus to a large
extent on fostering the growth of small firms, as exemplified in the Small Business Act
for Europe (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). At the same time, there
is a relative lack of policies stimulating ownership transfers to large established firms.
Such a policy focus is appropriate when the welfare losses to consumers primarily arise
from market imperfections. However, the same policy might be counterproductive when
the welfare losses to consumers instead mostly arise from distorted project choices by
entrepreneurs. In this case, the appropriate policy is to improve the market for mergers
and acquisitions by ensuring an effective bidding competition for target firms. This
could be achieved by making the tax system more neutral with respect to the choice of
retaining or selling a firm, and by improving the legal system to reduce the transaction
costs for a sale to incumbent firms.
Finally, it should be emphasized that our analysis is but a first step towards a more
comprehensive study of the effects of public policies on the market for entrepreneurial
innovations. A first limitation of our analysis is the lack of an explicit welfare analy-
sis, where the competing government objectives are integrated in a unified welfare-
theoretic framework. As a consequence, we have not derived optimal policies towards
entrepreneurship in this paper. A further important restriction is that our analysis has
been static in nature, even though a core reason for the support of entrepreneurial
innovations is their growth-promoting effect. We leave the analysis of these and other
extensions to future research.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
First, note that bi ≥ max vil, l = {e, i} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no
incumbent will post a bid equal to or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the
invention and that firm e will accept a bid iff bi > ve.
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Regime 1: Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗1, b
∗
2, ..., no), where b
∗
j < ve ∀j ∈ J.
It then directly follows that no firm has an incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash
equilibrium.
Then, note that the entrepreneur will accept a bid iff bj ≥ ve. But bj ≥ ve is a weakly
dominated bid in these intervals, since ve > max{vii, vie}. Thus, the assets will not be
sold in these intervals.
Regime 2: Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗1, b
∗
2, ..., yes). Then, b
∗
w > ve is not
an equilibrium since firm w would then benefit from deviating to bw = ve. Further,
b∗w < ve is not an equilibrium, since the entrepreneur would then not accept any bid. If
b∗w = ve − ε, then firm w has no incentive to deviate. By deviating to b′j ≤ b∗w, firm j’s
payoff does not change (j 6= w, e). By deviating to b′j > b∗w, firm j’s payoff decreases
since it must pay a price above its willingness to pay vii. Accordingly, firm j has no
incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, the entrepreneur’s payoff decreases since it
foregoes a selling price above its valuation ve. Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no
incentive to deviate and thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1, , , bn, yes) be a Nash equilibrium. If bw ≥ vii, then firm w will have the
incentive to deviate to b′ = bw − ε. If bw < vii, the entrepreneur will have the incentive
to deviate to no, which contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1, ..., bn, no) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneur will then say no iff
bh ≤ ve. But incumbent j 6= d will have the incentive to deviate to b′ = ve + ε in Stage
1, since vie > ve. This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
Regime 3: Consider equilibrium candidate b∗ = (b∗1, b
∗
2, ..., yes). Then, b
∗
w ≥ vii is a
weakly dominated strategy. Also b∗w < vii − ε is not an equilibrium since firm j 6= w, e
then benefits from deviating to bj = b
∗
w + ε, since it will then obtain the assets and
pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗w = vii − ε, and b∗s ∈
[vii − ε, vii − 2ε], then no incumbent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no,
the entrepreneur’s payoff decreases, as she foregoes a selling price exceeding her entry
valuation ve. Accordingly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to deviate and thus, b
∗ is
a Nash equilibrium.
Let b = (b1, ..., bn, no) be a Nash equilibrium. The entrepreneur will then say no iff
bh ≤ ve. But incumbent j 6= e will then have the incentive to deviate to b′ = ve + ε in
Stage 1, since vie > ve. This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.
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